Creativity is for people, arts for posh people by Oakley, K
This is a repository copy of Creativity is for people, arts for posh people.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/119861/
Version: Accepted Version
Book Section:
Oakley, K orcid.org/0000-0002-5225-0410 (2014) Creativity is for people, arts for posh 
people. In: Miller, T, (ed.) Routledge Companion to Global Popular Culture. Routledge , 
Abingdon, Oxon, UK . ISBN 9780415641470 
(c) 2014 Routledge. This is an author produced version of a book chapter published in The
Routledge Companion to Global Popular Culture. Uploaded in accordance with the 
publisher's self-archiving policy. Available online: 
https://www.routledge.com/9780415641470
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright 
exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy 
solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The 
publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White 
Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, 
users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
µ&UHDWLYLW\LVIRUSHRSOH± DUWVIRUSRVKSHRSOH¶ 
Popular culture and the UK New Labour Government 
 
Kate Oakley 
 
University of Leeds 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter considers both the understanding and treatment of popular culture in a particular 
period of British political history, that of the New Labour government, 1997-2010. Widely 
seen as popularizing, through identification with pop musicians and football (soccer) as well 
as through initiatives such as the Millennium Dome (McGuigan & Gilmore 2002) and the 
National Centre for Popular Music (Brabazon & Mallinder 2006), the chapter argues that in 
fact New Labour struggled with popular culture, much as its predecessors had.  While seen as 
useful for the branding RIDµ\RXQJFRXQWU\¶ particularly in the early days  of the 
Administration (Blair 2004), and for differentiating themselves from Conservative 
predecessors, with their concern for heritage and what was seen as a nostalgic understanding 
RI%ULWDLQ¶VFXOWXUe,  New LDERXU¶s promotion of popular culture, with the interesting 
exception of film, was largely symbolic. For the most part cultural funding supported the 
institutions it has always supported (Jancovitch 2011), the interests of rights-owners were 
consistently preferred over those of popular culture audiences, and popular cultural 
µWUDGLWLRQ¶ZDVOHIWWRWKHPHUF\RIWKHPDUNHWSODFHLQa way that would have been 
XQWKLQNDEOHIRUµKLJK¶FXOWXUDOIRUPVYet far from being a specifically New Labour problem, 
the chapter argues that this represents a long-term tension in the Labour party (Bianchini 
forthcoming 2014) and on the British Left in general and a public policy failure that is 
characteristic, not only of the UK. 
 Understanding popular culture   
 
New Labour politicians were sensitive to the claim that the party was obsessed with 
presenting itself as modern. Shortly after  entering office in 1997, the then-culture minister 
Chris Smith complained WKDWWDONRIµ&RRO%ULWDQQLD¶JDYHWKHLPSUHVVLRQthat, in cultural 
WHUPV1HZ/DERXUIHOW³anything modern is good and anything traditional bad,´ (Smith 
1998:4). It was an irritation he repeated when we interviewed him in 2012,  
 
³,JRWTXLWHIUXVWUDWHGE\WKHIL[DWLRQWKDWTXLWHDORWRIWKHPHGLDKDGRn this notion 
that the Blair era was part of some new esprit du temps that actually, was not related 
to what was going oni´ 
 
What was going on, according to Smith, was a desire to break down the distinction between 
high and popular culture, a desire which would be channeled LQWR1HZ/DERXU¶VIDYRred  
EX]]ZRUGVRIµDFFHVV¶DQGµH[FHOOHQFH¶ZLWKWKHXQIRUWXQDWHDQGXQLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFH
that the former term was associated with popular culture and the latter with high culture. 
Smith would have recoiled from any suggestion that popular culture could not be excellent 
and indeed there is some irony in the fact that New Labour figures were routinely mocked by 
their critics for liking popular music or football, as if such tastes could never in fact be 
genuine, but must spring from a mistaken desire to seem like one of the masses. 
 
However, as Looseley argues (2011), in his comparison of French and British approaches to 
popular cultural policy, while an admirable aspiration, in fact the discussion of breaking 
down distinctions is often simply a way to avoid questions of quality, judgment or even 
meaning in culture ± questions that British cultural policymakers have sought to duck since 
/RUG0HOERXUQH¶Vheartfelt remark, µGod helps the Minister that meddles with art,¶ back in 
the 1840s. While judgments about quality in the traditional art forms could safely be left to 
experts; applied to popular culture, policymakers seem to struggle with the notion of 
expertise, too often falling back on the representatives of the larger cultural industry firms, 
who having µcracked¶ the market for pop music or videogames, were assumed to be its 
guardians. 
 
When it came into office in 1997, New Labour inherited a tradition of cultural policy 
interventions, many deriving from the urban cultural policy initiatives of cities like London 
and Sheffield, which took popular culture seriously and sought to support it with public 
funds. Since 1994, with the birth of the National Lottery, the arts had experienced something 
of a boost (Putnam and Ellis 1998). In regions such as the North West of England, regional 
arts funders had seized an opportunity to support different sorts of cultural organisations ± 
small businesses, as well as not-for-profits ± in popular culture, as well as subsidised arts 
organizations 2¶&RQQRUDQG*X 2013). In part this was determined by the politics and social 
orientation of many of those active in local arts and cultural scenes; popular culture as the 
culture of the people was more like to be able to respond to and express the problems people 
were facing, from unemployment to sexism or racism. It was not that traditional art forms 
could not address these issues, even the highest of high art forms does so, but that widening 
and deepening the canon allowed communities and individualV¶ expression that had hitherto 
been denied or marginalized.  
 
This was New Labour¶VLQKHULWDQFHEXWLWZDs not necessarily 1HZ/DERXU¶Vunderstanding. 
Wary of anything that could be seen as class politics (or at least as working class politics), 
and of attachment to tradition, New Labour's cultural politics owned more to the 
postmodernism of Marxism Today magazine than it did to the traditional culture of the 
British Left. While such a hinterland could offer improved understandings of race, sexuality 
and gender relations; it was less attuned to the politics of place, which had animated the 
Specials Ghost Town, or the TV series Boys from the Blackstuff, as part of their concern about 
unemployment.  Unemployment, in these expressions, was not a general evil to be inveighed 
against, but a specific concern of people in particular places, and indeed it was suffered by 
particular people in particular places. Yet, as Rutherford argues (2013), the desire to see 
identity as a FRQWLQXDOO\VKLIWLQJFDWHJRU\PHDQWGLVHQWDQJOLQJWKHVXEMHFWIURPµFXOWXUDO
ORFDWHGQHVV¶,QVWHDGDVKHDUJXHV, KDYLQJµORVW¶WKHEDWWOHRI(QJOLVKLGHQWLW\QRW6RWV
Welsh or Northern Irish identity, which have different narratives) to the New Right and to 
Margaret Thatcher, New Labour came to power still fearing England as ³a reactionary 
country´(2013: 13). In this context, where as Doreen Massey had argued (1994); any seeking 
after a sense of place was suspect, 1HZ/DERXU¶V 
 
³mixture of social liberalism and economic liberalism led to a post-national 
cosmopolitanism which tended to valorise novelty, the global and change, over the 
ordinary, the local, and belonging´ (Rutherford 2013:). 
 
Instead New Labour sought a popular culture that was detached from place and particularity. 
The narrative that became the creative industries and later still the creative economy, 
consistently stressed the dynamism of the marketplace. In several Arts Council documents of 
the period, the vibrancy of the commercial cultural world is contrasted with what is perceived 
to be the precarious state of public arts funding.  
 
The state of the arts in Britain in the 1990s is characterised by an apparent paradox 
of, on one hand, financial instability within the public arts sector and on the other, 
thriving commercial success within the wider cultural industries (Hitchen 1997:1). 
 
For organization such as the Arts Council, the danger was being relegated to the µghetto¶ of 
subsidised culture, when the opportunity was perceived to lie elsewhere. In a note of the 
PHHWLQJEHWZHHQWKH%UXQVZLFN3XEOLF5HODWLRQVFRPSDQ\DQGWKH$UWV&RXQFLO¶V6WUDWHJ\
Group at the dawn of the New Labour Administration (Brunswick 1997), the need to identify 
the arts as part of the creatLYHLQGXVWULHVZDVPDGHFOHDU³Creativity is for people ± arts for 
posh people,´ it stated.  While music, design and the fashion industry were described as 
³dynamic and innovaWLYH¶´ the public arts economy was seen as unstable, heavily under-
resourced and suffering from personnel problems exacerbated by low pay, weak training and 
development (Hitchen 1997: 2). The solution, (and one could easily imagine others), was to 
place the not-for-profit sectors of the arts within the wider creative industries or creative 
HFRQRP\LGHQWLI\LQJWKHPZLWKWKHµGHPRFUDWLF¶QRWLRQRIFUHDWLYLW\ By the same token, the 
WUDGLWLRQDOµDUWV¶VHHQDVQHHGLQJVXEVLG\ were therefore not popular culture, despite a long 
history on the Left that might suggest otherwise (Samuel 2006; Bevir 2011) 
 
&KULV6PLWK1HZ/DERXU¶VILUVW6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHIRUFXOWXUHFODLPHGWKDWWKLVapproach was 
LQSDUWDERXWµEULQJLQJGHPRFUDF\WRFXOWXUH¶ZKLFKKHVDZnot as challenging the 
traditional makers and gatekeepers of culture, but as promoting access to culture that had 
already PRYHGEH\RQGGLVWLQFWLRQVRIµKLJK¶DQGµORZ¶In his praise for the vibrancy of 
commercial culture, Smith seems to suggest a different notion of cultural democracy from 
that which had been developing, albeit unevenly, at the local and regional level in the UK.  
$V2¶&RQQRUDUJXHVthat idea required public intervention in the marketplace for 
popular culture to try and ensure a more democratic culture based on embedded local 
PDUNHWV6PLWK¶VOLQHKRZHYHUHFKRHGE\$UWV&RXQFLOGRFXPHQWVDWWKHWLPHZDVLQGDQJHU
of conflating popular culture with democratic culture and, therefore, markets with democracy. 
6PLWK¶VDUJXPHQWZDVFRQFHUQHGZLWKSODFLQJWKHVXEVLGLVHGDUWVVHFWRUVQRWDWWKHVLGHRIRU
as an alternative to, commercial culture, but very much within ³a vibrant, resourceful and 
robust cultural HFRQRP\´ (Hitchen nd:4). But it assumed that having done so they would 
thrive rather than wither, and moreover, that the type of public intervention necessary was 
consistent with the broadly de-regulatory market-based approach that New Labour took to 
other areas of economic policy. It was not laissez faire; but the focus was on supply-side 
measures, help for small business start-ups, skills training for workers and subsidized work 
spaces. Intervention in terms of ownership, pricing or restricting market power was off the 
table. 
 
 
 
 
Popular cultural policies 
 
This can be seen most clearly in what can be described as New LDERXU¶VSRSXODUFXOWXUH
policy.  To describe it as such may suggest a more coherent approach than in fact one can 
point to, and of course popular culture policies can range far and wide, from broadcasting to 
sport to urban regeneration ZLWKRXWQHFHVVDULO\EHLQJODEHOHGDVµSRSXODUFXOWXUH¶ But it is 
worth considering some of the popular culture interventions of the period to see if one can 
determine how the understanding, described above, dictated policy.   
 
Given its view of popular culture, that it was essentially commercial culture, there should be 
little surprise that New Labour took its cue on policy from those who ran successful 
commercial businesses. The Creative Industries (CI) Taskforce was established after New 
Labour took office, with a remit to recommend steps to maximise the economic impact of the 
UK¶V creative industries at home and abroad (DCMS 1998). In addition to the civil service 
representatives of various Government departments, members were largely drawn from 
commercial cultural businesses. They included fashion designer Paul Smith, Eric Salama of 
advertising giant WPP, Gail Rebuck from publishers Random House and Robert Deveruex 
from Virgin Media as well as long time Labour supporters such as film director David 
Puttnam and Waheed Ali (founder of the TV production company, Planet 24). 
 
Smith GHVFULEHGWKLVDV³a way of bringing in people from the outside world who knew what 
they were talking about,´but what they were talking about in this case was a particular sort of 
large, transnational cultural industry business. Alan McGee as founder of Creation Records 
and a Scot, might be seen as one of the few representatives of non-metropolitan culture, 
though his days as an independent record company boss were long over by 1997, and there 
were no examples of local or regional cultural organizations on the Taskforce. The first 
output of the Taskforce, known somewhat inaccurately as Mapping Documents (DCMS 
1998, 2001a), were notable for the national lens through which they viewed the creative 
industries and it was not until 2000, following reports on export promotion (DCMS 1999a, 
1999c) that a sub-group considered the issue of the creative industries at a regional level 
(DCMS 2000a). 
 
The information resources and hence arguments were thus dominated by larger cultural 
businesses, with civil servants in particular, in a new and weak Government department, 
KDYLQJOLWWOHLQWKHZD\RIZKDW%HYLUZRXOGFDOODµtradLWLRQ¶(Bevir 2000) or policy narrative 
to counter or even add to that of the Taskforce. Smith described the first meeting of the 
Taskforce thus,  
³all the ministers came along with their briefs prepared by the civil servants and as 
we were going around the table with everyone contributing, they would read out their 
briefs, as ministers sometimes do.  And then the outsiders started contributing and 
VD\LQJZHOODFWXDOO\LWGRHVQ¶WKDSSHQOLNHWKDWDWDOO7KLVLVZKDW¶VLPSRUWDQWDQG
WKLVLVZKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJDQGWKLVLVZKDW¶VJRLQg on´ 
 
In this case, an asymmetry of informational resources was fairly clear from the start and 
µZKDWZDVJRLQJRQ¶ZDVQRWGHHPHGWRrequire input from small cultural business, 
individual practitioners, not for profits, arts advocates, or trade unions.   
 
7KHLURQ\RI1HZ/DERXU¶VSROLFLHVIRUWKHQHZO\-dubbed creative industries however was 
WKDWKDYLQJFRPSOHWHGLWVZRUNE\WKH&,7DVNIRUFHZDVZRXQGXSDQGWKH8.¶V
Culture Ministry, in the words of one of its own Secretaries of State rather µGURSSHGWKH
VWRU\¶RIFUHDWLYH industries policyii. Instead, most policy activity in the sense of funding 
decisions and organizational creation went on at the local and regional level, though the 
inheritance from the Taskforce was a clear, ideological one. Popular culture was commercial 
culture, the creative industries as a notion was a useful expression of this culture and its 
presumed dynamism, and market mechanisms were the primary ways of assisting that 
dynamism. 
 
Thus in terms of policies for popular culture, a pro-market approach was generally favoured.  
While the Broadcasting Act 1996, passed just before New Labour came into office, enabled 
the Minister for Culture to ensure that certain sporting events (such as the FA Cup Final and 
Wimbledon) were kept on free-to air TV, little efforts was made to extend the list or to 
respond to the concerns of those who saw the huge drain of live sports such as Test Cricket 
from free to air to pay TV. Ticket prices for cultural events such as the Glastonbury Festival 
or Premiership football were allowed to find a (high) market level, though tickets prices for 
classical and the opera remained subsidised. And, as Cloonan argues, the secondary sale of 
tickets for popular music remained legal; suggesting again that the µSURWHFWLRQ¶RIpopular 
music however important a part of British culture it is felt to be, was rarely taken seriously 
(Cloonan 2011).  
 
In terms of outlets for popular culture, while the loss of record shops from the high street was 
part of a wider shift to online consumption rather than a failing of New Labour, little effort 
was made to tighten planning legislation in favour of small book and record shops, pubs or 
nightclubs, all crucial elements of the urban cultural ecosystem. Similarly for live music, the 
2003 Licensing Act, made licensing a requirement even for small scale musical events in 
pubs. Although the chilling effect of this were not as bad as had been feared, and there was 
some response to the vigorous campaign against the Act, its passing hardly suggested a deep 
concern for the traditional wellsprings of popular cultural taste formation.  
 
In terms of funding, while elements of popular culture undoubtedly benefitted from some 
creative industry support, particularly that channeled by Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs) to workspace, training and other industry support, as Jancovitch has argued, core arts 
funding showed little shift (Jancovitch 2011; Gilmore 2013). In 2005, 85 per cent of money 
to cultural organisations went to those who had been funded before New Labour came to 
power. Many such organisations were no doubt doing a great job ± and long term, reliable 
funding would help with that -  but the lack of recognition for what Gilmore calOV³RUGLQDU\
µTXLHW¶ and everyday forms of culturDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ´LVDSSDUHQW (Gilmore 2013: 92).  
 
The huge growth in the use of digital technology during the New Labour period and the birth 
of social  PHGLDGLGOHDGDORQJZLWKWKHFRLQLQJRIXJO\QHRORJLVPVVXFKDVµSURVXPHUV¶WR
an explosion of interest in the cultural activities that people, particularly young people were 
undertaking online. But this focus arguably obscured interest in forms of non-digital 
participation. More significantly, cultural surveys throughout the period, particular the 
government-funded Taking Part surveyiii, which measured SHRSOH¶V participation in formal 
cultural activities, tend to portray µnon participation¶ in culture as a problem to be 
solved(Miles & Sullivan 2010; Jancovitch 2011; Gilmore 2013). Instead of starting from a 
consideration of what activities people get up to in their spare time; such surveys tend to 
present certain activities as cultural and others as not, fixing in policymakers minds a deficit 
model that can only be solved by prescribing more formal cultural activities ± and thus 
consistently avoiding questions such as, what do people like to do, and what constitutes 
popular culture in this place?  
 
$QH[DPSOHRIWKHSRSXODUFXOWXUHµSUREOHP¶LQWKH8.FDQEHVHHQLQWKHFDse of policy for 
videogames; one of the more significant cultural developments of the period. In late 1990s, 
British-developed games accounted for about 12 per cent of the US market and 25 per cent of 
the European, and the UK ranked second only to Japan in authoring computer games 
software (Leadbeater & Oakley, 2000). Having somewhat accidently acquired a burgeoning 
videogames sector, the tone was often celebratory, but in reality policymakers had little idea 
what to do with an activity with clear economic potential, but, to them, uncertain cultural 
merit. 
 Subsequent policy accounts of this period (see for example, Bakhshi, Mateos-Garcia & 
Gatland 2010) have often lamented the fact that the UK gave away what was appeared to be 
an economic advantage in a growing industry; but considerably less attention has been paid to 
the fact that it also gave away a cultural one. When I was interviewing UK games developers 
in the late 1990s, they often made reference to what they saw as the specific culture of British 
games; its links to the rave/club culture of the 1990s, fondness for fantasy or so called 'god' 
games WKHILUVWµgod¶game is generally considered to be Populous developed in 1989 by 
British videogames auteur Peter Molyneux), and a general preference for original story 
material over, for example, sports franchises. Developing original material however, unless it 
could be pursued into a highly successful series such as Grant Theft Auto, was always going 
to be a less profitable business than developing existing franchises, but many developers, 
Molyneux amongst them, often showed a preference for working in smaller firms on original 
material, rather than developing larger ones. As such the UK videogames industry suffered 
the fate of other UK cultural industries, with lots of small development companies, but no 
large publishers who could support development, hence developers went from project 
funding to project finding, essentially working for hire, and found it difficult to hold on to 
their intellectual property rights and build up a secure revenue stream. As the industry 
developed throughout the 2000s, the growth of mobile and online gaming required higher 
levels of investment, which many British development studios found difficult to support and 
the UK industry was seen to suffer in comparison with counties like France and Canada, who 
established videogames sectors somewhat later than the UK had, but provided them with a 
good deal of public support (Bakhshi, Mateos-Garcia & Gatland, 2010). 
 
At the time of writing, the UK is sill awaiting its first tax relief for video games (it is delayed 
by European Union concerns about state aid), though the legislation to introduce it was 
brought in by the current Coalition Government, along ZLWKRWKHUµFUHDWLYHLQGXVWU\¶WD[
reliefs for animation anGµKLJh HQG¶WHOHYLVLRQRQ a model that had been operating in the film 
industry since 2007. The first attempt to secure a tax relief for the videogames industry 
however, started around 2000 and founded, not on economic but on cultural grounds. When 
the independent games developers industry body TIGA began to lobby for an extension of the 
WD[UHOLHIVDYDLODEOHIRUUHVHDUFKDQGGHYHORSPHQWIRULVVXHVVXFKDVWKHµORRNDQGIHHOµRI
games characters, the then-GHSDUWPHQWIRU7UDGHDQG,QGXVWU\WKH8.¶VLQGXVWU\PLQLVWU\
(subject to a bewildering change of names since then) refused on the grounds that while there 
was a cultural argument for specific tax breaks for the film industry, no such arguments 
existed for games. And indeed this was hardly surprising as such as argument had rarely been 
made. Even those organisations supportive of the videogames sector, such as the publicly-
funded National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA), were generally 
promoting the supposed economic and job-creating credentials of the sector; cultural 
arguments about the particularity of UK games, the need for diversity in the games markets, 
the importance of a variety of voices in cultural production, were not made in the case of 
videogames. Moral panics about the downsides of gaming culture could in part account for 
this, but in addition there was a consistency in the perception of videogames that has been 
applied to other popular cultural forms in the past. Videogames were viewed as technological 
gizmos, gamers were alternately celebrated and suspect (Miller 2006), but the meaning of 
games and what games might have to tell us about the world were a subject fit for discussion 
only among fans. 
 
The communications regulator, Ofcom, floated the idea of public funding for content 
development, beyond broadcasting and cross digital platform in 2007 (Ofcom 2007). 
Sometimes described as µWKHSXEOLFVHUYLFHSXEOLVKHU¶WKLVPLJKWKDYHKHOGRXWWKHSRVVLELOLW\
of a great pluralism in videogame content, but the idea, already constrained as it was by the 
belief that only markets can drive innovation and quality,¶never came to fruition (see 
Freedman, 2009 for a discussion), and the majority of public funding for games development, 
was for so-called µserous JDPHV¶LQRWKHUZRUGVones that are of use to the military. 
 
The problems of popular cultural policy 
 
The failure to engage with the question of meaning in popular culture and hence with debates 
about quality, or value, and meant not only that popular culture was often left to the mercy of 
the market as described above, but that the terrain on which the debate was held was never 
shifted. New Labour¶VFUHDWLYH industry policies supported a variety of popular cultural 
activities, but beyond populist gestures, the case for why the state should take a role in 
popular culture was made only as an economic one. And that case was weakened by the fact 
that advocates were constantly over-claiming for the economic success of these sectors, thus 
raising the question, and not just in the minds of skeptical Treasury officials, of why should 
the state should put public money into something that was allegedly booming anyway.  
 
So far has the creative industries notion now drifted from any notion of cultural meaning that 
the latest attempt to revive the debate, 1(67$¶Vµ0DQLIHVWR¶IRUWKH&UHDWLYH(FRQRP\
(Bakhshi, Hargreaves &  Mateos-Garcia, 2013) defines the creative industries DV³WKRVH
sectors which specialisHLQWKHXVHRIFUHDWLYHWDOHQWIRUFRPPHUFLDOSXUSRVHV´ZKLFKQRW
only presumably rules out sectors such as television, which in many countries is a mix of 
commercial and public provision,  but completes the fusion of popular culture with the 
commercial. 
 
This tendency not to ask questions about the nature of popular cultural extended most 
profoundly to questions of quality. Although unavoidable in terms of the media, debates 
DERXWWKHµGXPELQJGRZQ¶RI%%&RXWSXWEHLQJDSHUPDQHQWIHature of British life, 
politicians, even those who seek to engage in questions of culture as some New Labour 
ministers did (Jowell, 2004) tended to avoid talk of quality as inherently elitist. The cultural, 
later creative, industries were valorized by policymakers largely because of their presumed 
economic dynamism, but also because they promised a way out of the excellence/access 
impasse; in the cultural industries the consumer was sovereign and market could rule 
(Looseley, 2011). 
 
This of course leaves cultural policy free to return to its home base of support for the 
traditional arts, or at least those art forms seen as unable to make it in the market.  This 
process had already begun under New Labour, as Looseley notes  (Looseley 2011); with 
Culture MinisWHU7HVVD-RZHOO¶Vwrestle ZLWKµ*RYHUQPHQWDQGWKH9DOXHRI&XOWXre,¶a 
µSHUVRQDOHVVD\¶ZULWWHQLQ(Jowell, 2004). In it, she again seeks to reject distinction of 
high, low, popular or elitist, but replaces this with the less-than-satisfactory notion of 
µFRPSOH[¶FXOWXUHZKLFKVHHPVWRHTXDWHWRWKHWUDGLWLRQDOKLJKDUWVWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRI
popular culture and indeed the time required to grapple with them seeming to not require 
government intervention.  Later in the New Labour period, further signals were given that the 
ODQJXDJHRIµH[FHOOHQFH¶ZDVDJDLQIDYRUHGLQFXOWXUDOSROLF\(McMaster 2008) and this was 
generally taken to equate to high culture and this trend has generally continued under the 
current Conservative/Liberal Coalition, as might expected.  
 A forty year experiment not just to democratize access to traditional art but to value popular 
culture  and understand the relationships between culture as art and culture as way of life 
(without necessarily collapsing them) seems to be at an impasse, and not just in the UK. The 
economic crisis, particularly in Europe, has seen huge state spending cuts which are likely to 
continue for some time, and a beleaguered arts sector has retreated to a comfort zone of 
excellence, with an eye to the market for wealthy tourists, µposh¶ people indeed. Despite 
routine evocations of internet-inspired emancipation, the popular cultural industries are as far 
from being democratically owned or controlled as ever, and the aestheticisation of daily life 
appears to have become permanently enmeshed with an image of wasteful consumption. 
Creativity might be for the people, but turning that into beneficial public policy seems some 
way away. 
 
Word count: 5,037 
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